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Do All the Resource Problems in
the West Begin in the East?
Jason F. Shogren
Economics can make good policy better and bad policy go away-a message often
constrained by the political realities surrounding federal resource policy toward the
West. This essay responds to these challenges to economic reasoning based on the
lessons learned after a stay at the Council of Economic Advisers. My goal is to help
make apolitical economists more effective advocates  of efficiency.
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One of the things Westerners  should ponder, but generally  do not,
is their relation to and attitude  toward the federal  presence.  The
bureaus  administering all the empty space that gives Westerners
much of their outdoor pleasure and many of their special privileges
and a  lot  of their pride  and  self-image  are  frequently  resented,
resisted,  or  manipulated by  those who  benefit economically  from
them but would like to benefit more, and are generally taken for
granted by the general  public.
-Wallace  Stegner,  Where the Bluebird Sings to
the Lemonade Springs
The Resource Policy Problem
Do all the resource problems  in the West begin in the East? This question nagged at
me throughout  my 1997 stay as the senior economist for environmental and natural
resource policy at the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) in the White House. By the
West,  I mean the Interior  Rural West;  by the East,  I mean  Washington,  DC.1 As I
witnessed  more  and  more  of the nature  of real-time  federal  policy  making  in the
Clinton-Gore Administration, I wondered more and more about the impact of the well-
intentioned and often half-baked zeal of advocates for new social regulations.  All this
effort was  especially troubling  in light of the Administration's  revealed  strategy  of
pursuing a centralized environmental agenda that is more unyielding toward the West
so as to secure support on the coasts. Imposing more federal will on the West through
tougher administrative  actions gathers more bi-coastal green votes. And this struggle
continues  today.  Western senators  keep  trying to free  some form of the centralized
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management  imposed  by the East by attaching  pro-development  riders  to different
appropriation bills.
Economics  can make good resource policy better and bad policy go away. Yet those
policy makers who might agree with these ends often object to economic analysis as the
means.  This essay revisits what I learned  concerning the noneconomist's  assertions
about our message as economists, and our role as messengers-assertions that when left
unanswered lessen our efficacy as advocates of a better world, and hurt our standing in
federal resource policy debates. Since most of you know more about traditional western
resource issues such as water rights, grazing, mining, and timber than I do, my focus
here is on new problems being pushed in Washington, DC, that straddle the traditional
western concerns-such as climate change, risks to children's welfare, and revamped
endangered  species  protection.2 My goal is to relay  the lessons  I learned  to others
interested in being more effective in policy debates about western resources.
Individualism vs. Social Regulation
The depths  of western discontent  for new social regulation, as exemplified by say, the
Sagebrush Rebellion in the early 1980s,3 finally became concrete for me during my time
at the CEA. New rules pushed in Washington, DC, in the name of morality triggered my
sense of wonder-I wondered why economics  seems to have such minimal impact on
rational thinking about how these new rules would affect the country in general and the
West in particular.  I wondered if all the pundits who push for states rights and local
control were correct. Was this indeed the Century  of the State, in which the federal
leviathan ruling the West has left us worse off than if we had just taken care of our-
selves?4 Why are private expenditures to comply with social regulation exceeding $200
billion and rising-large  enough now that Robert Litan of the Brookings Institution
points out that "federal regulation now costs consumers more than total discretionary
government spending costs taxpayers."5
By now I  was really  confused.  As you  probably  do  not  know,  three  years  ago  I
returned to my alma mater, Wyoming, recently dubbed by The Economist (1998) as the
most conservative socialist state in the Union-a most curious mix. My colleague Tom
Crocker refers to this split personality in the West as "socialism for me, free enterprise
for you." I know this attitude partly from growing up in northern Minnesota, another
land of the well-subsidized  classical liberal.  So even though I promote individualism,
demand freedom,  and publish in Public Choice, I also applaud the role of the federal
government in helping my family out of the backwoods  to the blackboard.  I was as
schizophrenic as the rest of the West-clamoring for more control over setting my own
standards for social regulation,  but still wanting to preserve the hard-won resources
subsidies that lined my pockets.
2  Also  see Shogren (1998a).
3For a discussion of the Sagebrush Rebellion, see, for example, Cawley.
4For examples of different perspectives toward stewardship, see Anderson and Leal; Berry; Ciriacy-Wantrup; and Robbins.
5 Quoted in Passell. In all fairness, these same questions could be asked for eastern states as well-but the East has plenty
of pundits to deal with its problems.
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Pre-CEA, it seemed to me common sense waxed and waned in Washington,  DC, but
that bad ideas would collapse under the deadweight losses they created more often than
not. Professionals were in charge, and there was no need for me to worry about whether
or not the West (or I) had a split personality. That left me free to ponder the significance
of third  derivatives  of probability  functions  and  third-order  stochastic  dominance
instead  of  the  happenings  in Washington,  DC.  I  could  continue  in  my  role  as  a
middlebrow theorist who loved the lab of experimental economics-trained  and proud
to be an apolitical neoclassical economist. And as such, I accepted as a necessary fiction
rather than as literal truth our confining orthodoxy of maximization and equilibrium
to capture the interactions of intelligent  self-interested individuals.
Post-CEA,  however,  is a different  story. Don't get me wrong-I still treasure the
formalism of theory and behavior in the lab. But now I understand that some people see
our orthodoxy as not just simply confining, but as downright prehistoric.6 Being called
a dinosaur to my face drove that point home fairly well. And I see that my inability to
communicate key economic concepts effectively left the floor open for wily arguments
that more federal usurping of state and local control was desirable even if costs exceeded
benefits.  Because after all, cost-benefit analysis is just naked self-interest dressed up
in banker's  pajamas, isn't it?
For instance,  the Environmental  Protection Agency  (EPA) recently  estimated  the
retrospective costs and benefits of the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) between 1970
and 1990. Section 812 requires the EPA to assess periodically how the Clean Air Act has
affected "public health, economy, and environment of the United States," and to report
these findings to Congress (U.S. EPA 1997). Not surprisingly, this self-evaluation found
that federal regulatory actions created substantial net benefits from lower criteria air
pollutants.  Thus  the EPA  inspector general's  recent  pronouncement  of widespread
failures by state and local officials to police the nation's clean air is a bit unexpected
(see, e.g., Cushman). These mixed messages  send the signal that although the EPA is
doing good, it could do even better if more environmental  affairs were handled at the
federal, rather than the state or local levels.
It is news like this that makes me think economics is still a speed bump on the road
of bad ideas. And it causes  me  to reflect back  on whether the arguments  leveled at
economics  and economists  are accurate,  and why my counter-arguments  at the CEA
were less than persuasive.  How restrictive is our orthodoxy, and why do we have such
a hard time changing the minds of critics who consider economics "not so much dismal
as half-witted" [attributed to Sir Crispin Tickell in The Economist (1997)]?
This essay confronts what I see as my own over-optimism in the power of economics.
Some points might seem trivial, easily remedied by anyone on a debating team. Others
might hit a nerve,  suggesting that a bit more  self-awareness  of what outsiders  are
really saying to us economists might be a good thing. If we want to hone our skills as
advocates for rules that give people in the West the chance to create their own luck, we
need to revisit and reemphasize the sophisticated informality that can help make that
happen.
6 For example, Degaudio is quite animated about this point: "Anyhow, the people have little interest in the ideas  of the
professors of economics....  [T]he people have little patience of academic incrementalism and less stake in the excessively cute
laws concocted to make federal agencies  do paperwork" (p.  6).
ShogrenJournal  of Agricultural  and Resource Economics
Resource Policy  Debates:
The Critic's Assertions,  the Economist's Responses
In policy debates in Washington,  DC, economists are tagged as lemon-suckers-those
who could find fault in a funhouse. Economists are the "but"-sayers who point out the
reality of scarcity,  a fact intensely disliked by ideologues  and moralists. These critics
make assertions about the limits of the economist's choice of tools to cast doubt on the
message, and they make assertions about the economist's toolbox to cast doubt on the
messenger.
I learned to appreciate  from  my experience  that an unanswered assertion  sticks,
regardless of its truthfulness. Below are nine allegations made, explicit and implicit, in
resource policy debates, and my responses. It  would have been better to have come up
with these retorts sooner, like during the policy meetings. But quick responses were not
always forthcoming given my training in the classic Nordic school of debate in which one
makes a pronouncement, expects acquiescence,  ignores faultfinding until it stares him
down, and then responds with a "but...." I hope now that these responses to common
complaints  will  help  better  prepare  those  economists  interested  in becoming  less
apolitical.
*  Economists always overestimate the costs of federal regulation. Thus it is likely that
the estimated impacts on the U.S.  economy of the Kyoto climate change treaty are
simply too high.
Not so fast. Ray Squitieri (1998) has compiled the actual evidence,  and he finds that
costs just as often are on the low side. For instance, predictions straddle actual costs
for asbestos, coke ovens, and vinyl chloride regulation; numerous unpredicted changes
in technology and the economy have emerged to lower the cost of chlorofluorocarbon
emissions (CFCs), cotton dust, and SO2 control. Also recall that the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards were estimated to be achieved by 1977, but these standards
are still not attained in 75 areas with 75 million people. Sure, economists predicted
the control costs for sulfur dioxide could be $1,500 per ton, when today the actual cost
per ton is $100.  Good reasons exist that explain this gap-unanticipated technology
breakthroughs, railroad deregulation, many permits were given out for free. Costs are
not systematically biased upward. This implies that the cost estimates to implement
the Kyoto treaty could be low. Note that Kyoto calls for industrial nations to reduce
their  carbon emissions  by  about  7%  below  1990 levels  by the period  2008-2012,
without the help of the developing nations (whose emissions are projected to surpass
today's industrial nations within the next three or four decades). Imagine turning a
battleship on a dime with only a third of the crew on board, and you get a good feel
for the potential costs of the Kyoto climate change treaty.7
* Economics downplays risks to children's health and welfare. Just look at the new
federal air  pollution standards  for ozone and particulate  matter. President  Clinton
supported the tighter standards even though the costs might exceed  the benefits,
because he wants kids to be healthy. We're for kids-whose side are you on?
7For an overview of the benefits and costs of the Kyoto climate change  accord,  see Shogren (1998b).
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Of course economics is not for just "kids"-we are for kids with food in their bellies,
clothing  on  their backs,  roofs  over their heads.  Economics  promotes  these  ends
through the creation of wealth. So since everyone is for kids, what is the problem? At
issue is how the insights from economics about the direct and indirect links between
wealth  and  health  can  be  more  clearly  communicated  without  seeming  callous.
Pointing out that the conspicuous neglect of behavioral rules can inflate the costs of
regulation at no gain in kids' health does not sell politically if the route is too indirect.
The  appearance  of helping  kids,  even  at the price  of taking  aid  away in reality
through more  regulation,  will still be  more  appealing  to policy  makers  than the
roundabout way to wealth through more trade. This is not to say economics cannot
improve  on how  we model risks  to kids.  Economics  would  benefit from more  age
heterogeneity in our models since kids rarely have economic standing even when they
have legal standing. Kids deserve  special attention,  and that does not necessarily
imply more federal control over state and local resources  policies.
*  Economics oversells individualism  and exaggerates  the ability of locals to solve their
own problems  in the West. After all, if locals are  so good at solving their  own problems,
why  were  all those federal Acts  like the Endangered Species Act  (ESA) and the
National  Environmental  Policy Act (NEPA) enacted in the 1970s?
But over the last decade we have witnessed that the costs imposed by such supralocal
intervention into private property have triggered a devolution of power back to more
local levels. The ESA, for instance, is one of the most extreme forms of federal inter-
vention, the quintessential  prohibitive  policy. In its shadow, people have turned to
cooperative  conflict-resolution mechanisms that involve mainly local stakeholders.
These mechanisms have flourished despite traditional environmentalists who remain
locked into federal intervention because of their concern that locals will neglect local
habitat. New field experiments in Coase-style bargaining have emerged in which local
people are engaged in the communication, education, and cooperation in the ESA and
NEPA processes.8 This trend will likely continue. Economics has not exaggerated the
role of the local person, the individual, in helping to define and implement rules we
can all live with to deal with resource issues in the West.
* Economics is too pessimistic  about how people can adapt  their  preferences to new tech-
nologies to solve resource  policy questions  such as climate  change in which engineering
studies  suggest that  from 20 to 25% of existing emissions in the greenhouse  gases that
cause climate change could be eliminated  at no additional  costs. In effect, economists
take a creationist  view toward  preferences.
Sure, people will often do the right thing, frequently without having to be prodded by
a change in relative prices. A better-informed U.S. populace could achieve the Kyoto
targets by changing their minds about the risks of climate change. Economists  are
skeptical of these arguments because we usually see people as people, whose prefer-
ences  are similar across the ages  and around the world.  When the evidence  says
that people prefer conventional appliances  given current prices,  we believe it.  We
8 For instance,  see Brown and Shogren;  Gould,  Schaiberg,  and Weinberg;  and Kite, Harris, and Thone.
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also believe  there  is a fundamental  distinction  between people's  preferences  and
a true market failure.  The market does not fail when people focus  on immediate
outlays  even  when given future  cost savings estimates,  and when they are wary
about claimed  energy savings that might  go unrealized.  Economists  see the most
effective  way to curb excessive  energy consumption  is to raise its price to reflect
the harmful effects on the environment of burning fossil fuels.  Of course,  econom-
ics  can  benefit  from  understanding  the  origin  of  preferences,  but  for  the  most
part, preferences  are taken as stable given the exchange institution in which they
operate.
*  Economics downplays the discontinuities  and disequilibria  of nature.
There is cogency here in that resource policy discussions eventually reach the point
in which the economist is asked whether he or she has accounted for the likelihood
that a change in the ecosystem will be discontinuous-a catastrophe. Most economists
acknowledge,  but do  not  always  incorporate  into  their models,  the  potential  for
discontinuous risks, like a sudden shift in the gulf stream due to climate change, or
an unraveling of the web of life due to the loss of some keystone species. But does this
mean that society is on the cusp of catastrophe? Not necessarily-the  doom sayers
have a terrible track record. As revealed in numerous risk-perception studies, people
commonly overestimate the chance that they will suffer from a low-probability/high-
severity event, for example, a nuclear power accident  (see, e.g., Viscusi). When the
outcome is potentially very bad, people inflate the chance that the outcome will be
realized. This tendency transfers to policy makers as well. They overestimate the risk
themselves and then multiply this impact by playing off the same tendency in the
general public. For example, resource policies toward the storage of nuclear waste in
the West can conjure up images of a fortified storage facility containing sanitized, air-
tight receptacles, or an abandoned dump site teeming with rusty, leaking vats of toxic
material.  The  images  induce  vivid  perceptions,  both  of which  can  persist in  a
community, causing considerable disagreement about how to regulate the risk. Policy
makers must act as the arbiters who help reconcile the perceptions, not inflame the
differences.
* Economics has a built-in bias toward the status quo business world, and acts as a
mercenary for the corporate bottom line.
Not true, but economists only have themselves to blame for this perception that we
are good at telling some people's stories but not others. Economists have allowed the
general media to portray economics  as synonymous with financial  and commercial
concerns. When a person hears about the local promotion of "economic development"
in the West, it sounds as though economists are only concerned  with financial and
commercial development. But economists worry as much about Main Street as we do
about Wall Street. We need to better communicate the broader perspective of welfare
economics to the general public. For example, appealing to economics does not imply
that legions  of endangered  and threatened  species  must be  sacrificed.  Numerous
economic  reasons exist for preservation:  some  species  and habitats provide useful
goods and services,  others are valued aesthetically,  and even seemingly low-value
species are linked to high-value species through ecosystem interactions. People need
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to understand that economics  is not just concerned  with timber sales  from chain-
sawing through critical habitat.
*  Economists who promote cost-benefit analysis  fail the elementary  political  test ofper-
suasion because such efforts increase  the scale of political controversy  by entrenching
conflict through venturing to put values on losses inconsolable by money.
Not so fast.  Most thinking people now agree with Hayek's forceful  point that the
market is the most powerful tool ever "discovered" by humans to integrate efficiently
the diffuse set of knowledge that exists throughout the economy. Market prices reflect
both the laws of man  and the laws of nature.  Like language,  no one invented the
market,  but it has  emerged  as the promoter  of more rational  choices  on  how to
allocate scarce resources. Cost-benefit analysis simply takes this rationale  one step
further by collecting and organizing diffuse knowledge into a common framework for
goods and services often left unvalued by the market. If one agrees that the market
works as a knowledge magnet that facilitates rational  choice and cooperation,  it is
self-defeating  to argue against cost-benefit  analysis since it works  under the same
principle.
*  Economists need to realize that science drives  policy, morality sets policy. Economics
is most useful when it sticks to estimating  the costs to implement the policy selected.
This  is  wrong.  Economists  have  actually turned  over  too  much authority  to  the
natural sciences in resource policy decisions.  In a recent work entitled Consilience:
The Unity of  Knowledge, E. O. Wilson claims that economics is largely irrelevant to
resources  problems because  we avoid the complexities  of the "foundation sciences"
such as psychology and biology. But this sword cuts both ways. The circle of environ-
mental knowledge  is also broken when ecological  and biological  models ignore the
impact that the economic system has on the natural system. Natural science alone
cannot accurately answer the question about whether  we confront an environment
problem or not. Economics contributes to the answers because relative market prices
and wealth play a vital role in establishing the threshold that determines whether
an environmental  problem  is a real problem.  These so-called  foundation  sciences
need  to  connect  mind  to matter  by including  economic  parameters  in their core
frameworks.  Economists have a responsibility to correct this omission in debates of
environmental  policy.  We  have  an  obligation  to  help  define  the  environmental
thresholds of human and ecosystem health that underpin policy, rather than settle
for a secondary role. We need to move our feet further under the table where resource
policy and research are defined.
How do these assertions and responses speak to the title of this essay? Will the West
suffer because economists  are misunderstood  in the East?  Sure. Is  there something
we can do about it? You bet. We can continue to demonstrate and communicate that
behavior  matters  more to  resource  policy than most  people  think.  With  additional
empirical trade-off analysis that sharpens the economic viewpoint, we can increase the
costs to policy makers who neglect or downplay the importance of behavior in resource
policy. Policy makers can benefit from clean evidence that reveals how resource  policy
could be less expensive when accounting for relevant economic behavior.
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But economics  offers a message that tilts the scale toward the conservative  side of
western schizophrenia,  a side that the West might not really want despite the rhetoric.
People  in  the  West  have  two  trails  to  choose  from:  the pull-yourself-up-by-your-
own-bootstraps path in which the lone cowboy self-image is a reality, and the cowboy-
with-complex-preferences-with-his-hand-out  path in which the West grudgingly accepts
intervention in exchange for goodies. On the lone-cowboy trail, economics says go ahead
and blame the East for ignoring sound arguments against bad rules, push for devolu-
tion, but do away with subsidies that define the landscape. This trail presupposes that
our willingness to accept responsibility and accountability exceeds that of the absentee
landowners,  private and public,  who currently  dominate  the western landscape.  An
open-space future for the West, then, depends on our own willingness and ability to pay
for the empty space we cherish.  On the complex-cowboy trail, however, economics says
the West has only itself to blame for more federal intervention, and we must continue
to work with the East to set goals, review which subsidies stay and which go, and accept
a watered-down version of devolution.  The West still must come to terms with what it
is  and what  it really wants.  Persuasive  economic  reasoning  can  help guide  either
direction we choose to take.
Advocating Efficiency  Through Sophisticated Informality
Let's end on a broader perspective.  It  took awhile, but I finally get it-a sense of the
seriousness that drives many economists. The bigger picture I purposefully avoided in
my apolitical pursuit to master the meaning of the third derivative is unavoidable. I now
see my role-perhaps our role (you are the judge of that)-as more than an accountant
of the axiomatic. My concern is less about whether, say the value of recreation fishing
per day trip is really $3.54 or $4.12, but is more about letting moralists and ideologues
make all the big decisions. Do we take ourselves out of the real-time debates on social
order by only trying to sway each  other? For as hard as it is to convince anonymous
reviewers of one's ideas, it is often harder to de-jargon and communicate these ideas
clearly to one's  parents. But we do have  a responsibility to point out that new rules
remain undesirable unless the benefits exceed the costs.
Economists have made significant inroads into resource policy at the federal level-
the  push to  codify  cost-benefit  regulatory  reform  in Congress,  the endorsement  of
tradable carbon emission permits in Kyoto. Successes like these reveal that good ideas
stick over the long run. But economics has its own problems that deserve more atten-
tion.  Economic  historian  Mark  Blaug  attributes  our  problems  to  being too  easily
distracted from reality to escapist puzzles and second-order  technicalities.9 We often
suspend the craft of diplomacy and inflate our status in the discourse of public policy by
giving too little credibility to the existence of political "wise men." The scorched-earth
approach  driven by economic  correctness  comes  across as callous  and arrogant, and
often counterproductive in resource policy settings, a lesson I learned too late. And while
we  do  not have  to be wallflowers,  more  emphasis  on the aggressive,  sophisticated
informality as used by Schultze and Keynes and Friedman to advocate efficiency seems
most worthwhile.
9 Also see Krugman  (forthcoming) for a response that promotes the idea of sophisticated informality.
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This all makes good sense and we should do more of it. How do we accomplish this?
One way to start is to accept our responsibility to inform others, not expect others to
automatically understand us. I now see the value in taking one's ideas that have sur-
vived the furnace of professional journals, remolding them into everyday language, and
publishing  them in mainstream  outlets  where "normal"  people might  actually read
them. ° 1 Some of us do this already; more should try, including me. Paul Krugman (1997)
is the current role model  for this conduct.  Another step I have taken  is to have my
graduate students write "memos to the President," an assignment that encourages them
to translate what they  are  doing into plain English and  explain why it matters  for
society.  If the current  short-term incentives  in academia  do  not exist to take  these
steps-we should do it anyway. We have to care enough about our ideas to get them into
broad daylight.
I recall reading in the New York  Times sometime within the last year that for 5,000
years, the best humans could do was to increase our life expectancy by five years. About
200  years  ago,  however,  something  changed-and  since then  Western  culture  has
witnessed a 30-year increase in how long we might live. Was it is just a coincidence that
around the same time, The Wealth of Nations was published? I do not think so. For two
centuries  economists  from  Adam  Smith  to Hayek  and beyond  have  argued  for the
market as the best way to organize the diffuse set of information and to direct motiva-
tions in society. The market is a process of discovery,  a creator of wealth-and more
wealth creates more health. And while I know this is "over the top," I am willing to give
economists credit for at least 21 of those 30 extra years. Furthermore, we can continue
to do good things if we keep working to give people a chance to invest in themselves so
they can create their own luck. Behavior matters, and economists who can explain why
in simple and well-timed language  can help make resource policy better, in both the
East and the West.
[Received August 1998;  final revision received October 1998.]
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